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The objective of this paper is to empirically test across alternative,  apparently observationally
equivalent  theories  of currency crises  that are often difficult  to distinguish  from each  other
based on the behavior of commonly used predictors.  Using a new, comprehensive data set on
gross extemal assets and liabilities  for  167 countries,  this study is able  to make a significant
move  towards  redressing  this  shortcoming.  The  focus  is  on  identifying  potential  crisis
predictors as  well as testing the  validity of the distinct transmission mechanisms  implied by
various  theories  of crisis.  There  is  strong  evidence  in  support  of insurance-based  models
suggesting that proxies  for the  accumulation  of contingent liabilities  are an effective  crisis
predictor.
There  is  a  large  and  growing  literature  that  emphasizes  the  role  of capital  flows  and/or
imperfect  domestic  financial  intermediation  in generating  crises.  This  "third-generation"  of
currency  crisis  models (Dooley,  1997;  Chang and Velasco,  1998; iCalvo,  1993),  focuses  on
the central bank's function as lender of last resort as a contributing factor to moral hazard in
domestic banking  (insurance  models), mismatched  external  assets and  liabilities  (illiquidity
models)  and volatile  capital flows to emerging markets  in fixed exchange  rate environments
("sudden  stop"  models  and  the  literature  on  the  optimal  sequencing  of capital  account
liberalization).  Common  prescriptions  are  imposing  capital  account  restrictions  and  IMF
lending to bolster international  reserves.
No one would disagree that a well-regulated,  deep financial sector is desirable. But in policy
prescriptions,  what  weight  should  be  assigned  to  central  bank  guarantees,  or  to  the
accumulation  of net  short-term  debt  by  the  domestic  banking  sector?  Certainly,  they  are
closely related,  but the relevant institutional  response would be  different.  In the absence of
exchange  or capital controls,  any convertible  exchange  rate  will ensure  that the economy is
illiquid  always.  The  central  bank  must  stand  ready to  exchange  domestic  currency  for its
liquid foreign assets even though  its currency  liabilities will  always be the greater of the two
quantities.  Since a currency crisis is always a potential equilibrium under this logic, the root
of the  problem  is  likely  to  lie elsewhere,  say  in insurance/moral  hazard,  or  in  domestic
banking  failures  or in inconsistent  domestic macroeconomic  policies.  A related  question  is
2that of the  effectiveness  of capital  account restrictions.  Policy formulations  require  a clear
understanding  of the  underlying  causes  of the  crisis.  However,  distinguishing  across  the
transmission mechanisms  of many of these models requires data that is not readily available,
which is precisely the main theme of this paper.
The  rest  of this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  briefly  reviews  the  empirical
literature  on the prediction of currency crises.  Section 3 describes  the motivation behind this
paper  and  its  contribution  to  the  existing  literature.  Section  4  describes  the  empirical
methodology and data used  in testing across theories  of crises.  Section 5 presents the results
of the  probit model  estimations  of alternative  crisis  specifications.  Section  6 describes  the
results  of the endogeneity  tests between  growth  and occurrence  of a  currency crisis,  and of
the bivariate  probit model used to jointly estimate the likelihood of a currency crisis and of a
slowdown  in growth  or a recession.  Section 7 concludes  and the appendix contains  details of
the construction  of the  variables,  estimation  output,  and  summary  of empirical  tests  in the
existing literature.
2: Literature Review:
A. Crisis Predictors and Early Warning Indicators
A. 1:  Review  of Earlier  Empirical  Work:  This section presents a  summary of the theories of
crisis,  as  distinguished  by  their  particular  transmission  mechanisms  and  empirical
implications. The purpose  is to shed some light on how we can distinguish across  seemingly
observationally equivalent  theones of crisis with the new variables  in the data  set.  Table 2
provides  a  comparison  how  this  database  on net  and  gross  foreign  asset positions  allows
improved identification  of the distinct transmission mechanisms implied by seemingly similar
theories of currency crises.
Some other studies have used similar variables to predict crises. Most studies include "capital
account"  variables  in their analysis.  Ten of the sixteen  studies  surveyed by Kaminsky et al
(1996) include international reserves,  either as a proportion of imports or of GDP, and all find
it a statistically significant predictor. Otker and Pazarbasioglu  (1994 and  1995) find evidence
in support of the interest  rate and  inflation differential  with the United States being relevant
3predictors.  In  addition,  several  studies  (Eichengreen,  Rose  and  Wyplosz  (1995  and  1996),
Milesi-Ferretti  and Razin  (1995),  Otker and Pazarbasioglu  (1995),  Kaminsky  and  Reinhart
(1996), find support for including past crises as predictors.
Demirguc-Knut  and Detragiache  (1998)  also use a probit analysis  but with a broader set of
vanables  than  Kaminsky  and  Reinhart  (1996  and  1998)  who  focus  on  the  relationship
between banking and currency crises and on the impact of financial  liberalization (which is
the  only  significant  predictor  of  banking  crises  in  their  study).  Demirguc-Knut  and
Detragiache  (1998)  study  a panel  of 53  countries  over the  period  1980-95.  One of the  key
factors  in banking  crisis prediction  according  to them is extemal  vulnerability  measured  by
broad money to intemational reserves.
Edwards  (1989)  finds  that  the  probability  of  devaluation  is  affected  predictably  by  the
variable net foreign assets/M1. Klein and Marion (1994) also find that the ratio of net foreign
assets of the monetary sector to MI is a significant predictor as is the same ratio squared. The
latter  however  is  not  robust  to  changes  in  the  specification.  Net  foreign  asset  positions
conceal  some  useful  infornation  about what is  really going  on;  additionally,  the  Edwards
(1989)  and  Klein  and Marion  (1996)  studies had  limited coverage  since data  on net foreign
asset positions (henceforth NFAs) is readily available for only a limited number of countries.
Frenkel  and  Rose  (1996)  estimate  a  multivariate  probit  to find  that concessional  debt/total
debt, foreign  direct investment/total debt and foreign interest rates all help predict crises one
year  in  advance.  However,  these  studies  rely  either  on  short-term  external  debt  data  as
reported by member countries to the World Bank or net capital flows (readily available from
the Intemational Financial  Statistics of the IMF, hereafter IFS) and their composition.
Kaminsky  and  Reinhart  (1998)  do  not  include  any  financial  flows  in  their  regressions.
Corsetti,  Pesenti  and Roubini  (1998),  include  short-term  foreign  debt,  and non-performing
loans as a proportion of bank assets (as a proxy for weakness  in the domestic banking sector).
Their data on the banking sector is useful.  They primarily base their information on domestic
banks' external  liabilities to foreign banks in 18 developed countries.  Their figures match the
World  Bank-IMF-BIS  database  on external  liabilities.  Their  coverage  though  is  poor,  and
4suffers  from  two  major shortcomings.  First,  they  have a  sample of nine  "crisis" countries.
This raises problems of overestimation  of the effect of the included regressors.  Second,  they
consider a very short time series.
It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  when  one  is  discussing  "third-generation"  models,  a
common feature in their transmission mechanisms (Dooley,  1998;  Chang and Velasco,  1997;
Kletzer  and  Chinn,  1999)  is the  existence  of a potential  crisis  equilibrium  whose  timing
depends  on  something  not  quite  captured  by  fundamentals  as  typically  defined  in  first
generation  crises.  Domestic  investors  perceive  that  the  economy  as  a  whole  is  "illiquid"
(Chang and  Velasco,  1997),  and  that a "run on the central  bank"  would be self-validating.
Alternatively,  they decide  that the government's  contingent liabilities from their implicit  (or
explicit) commitrnent to insuring the domestic financial sector are hitting a threshold level, so
a  speculative  attack  would  work  (Dooley,  1998).  In  a  similar,  analytically  more  formal
model,  the  failure  of  the  banking  sector  is  endogenized  so  that  the  crisis  is  due  to  the
govermnent's expected monetization of the banking sector losses, while the losses themselves
arise  because asymmetric  information  introduces  adverse  selection  incentives.  (Kletzer  and
Chinn,  1999).
A.2:  The Insurance  Model:  In all of the post-Asian  crisis theories,  the  government's  or the
banking sectors balance sheet is a key factor in determining whether a crisis will occur. This
is emphasized in the insurance model as well (Dooley,  1998).  In this model, the crisis occurs
because  of the  conflict  between  two  government  objectives:  the desire  to  insure  domestic
residents'  liabilities and the need to accumulate liquid assets. The government's  insurance of
the  financial  sector  (banks  and  non-bank  financial  intermediaries)  raises  the  yield  on
domestic  assets  above  the  intemational  risk-free  interest  rate.  This  yield  differential  gets
smaller  and then  is  reversed  as the  government's  contingent  liabilities  approach,  and  then
increase to  a  level greater  than its reserves.  If the  government  insures  a proportion of total
external liabilities, this suggests that the economy's gross liabilities determine the size of the
claims on the government,  and in conjugation  with reserves, the timing of the crisis. This is
especially  true if there is a ceiling on the extent to which private  assets can be appropriated.
5This  argument  is  consistent  with  an increase  in private  capital  inflows  before  the crisis;  a
stylized fact associated with the currency crisis episodes of the eighties and nineties.
Capital flight in this context becomes  both,  a measure of private expectations  regarding  the
exchange  rate and the future relative  price of domestic and  foreign assets, and  a measure  of
domestic agents'  ability to prevent expropriation  of their assets.
Thus,  to test  the insurance  model  one  would  like  to have  access  to  data  on  capital  flight,
measured consistently  across  a large sample of countries,  and gross foreign liabilities,  stocks
as well as flows.
Ideally,  the insurance  logic could also be tested using some criteria of bank inefficiency such
as non-performing  loans,  or by using banking  crises as  a proxy for  a weak financial  sector,
since a test of Granger causality can be used to check that currency crises are not the source
of banking  crises.  At the same time,  there are arguments that a banking crisis  can occur if a
devaluation  spirals up the liabilities side of the  financial  sector's balance  sheet. This is also
however an indication  of an  imperfection  in the domestic  banking sector,  since in a perfect
world there should be risk pooling, so banks would insure  themselves against exchange-risk.
While  the database  developed by Caprio  et al (World  Bank,  2001),  fills a useful  gap,  it is
noteworthy  that the  countries  surveyed mostly refused  to disclose  any information  in their
response to the question on non-performing  loans.
A.3:  The  Illiquidity  Model:  The  stylized  fact  that  currency  crises  are  associated  with  a
cessation  or reduction in capital  inflows implies, by definition,  that there must be a decrease
in the current account deficit or in foreign reserves or both. If the exchange rate is pegged, the
authorities  are  intervening  in  the  exchange  market  to  adjust  quantities,  as  prices  cannot
change.  This makes  the central bank  vulnerable  to runs  since any reallocation of portfolios
away from' domestic assets involves a fall in their international  reserves.  The central bank, as
lender  of last  resort,  is  committed  to  stand  ready  to  swap  its  foreign  assets  for domestic
currency.  The entire  stock of domestic  currency  is the liability of the monetary  authorities.
Thus,  the  absence  of capital  restrictions  generates  a situation  that is  similar  to  that of an
6ordinary bank having only liquid liabilities.  While the monetary authorities have liquid assets
as well,  the stock of these is typically greatly exceeded by the stock of their liquid liabilities.
Thus,  a run  on the central  bank can be thought of as  one of multiple potential outcomes.  In
addition, if an economy's  short-term foreign liabilities exceed the short-term foreign assets  it
can  lay  its  hands  on  if its  creditors  pull  out,  a  speculative  attack  is  likely  to  succeed.
Borrowing  foreign reserves  only  increases  the central bank's  foreign denominated  liabilities
while increasing at the same time the economy's monetary base.
Another  implication  of the  theory  is  that  capital  controls  should  succeed  in preventing  a
crisis, by limiting  the extent to which foreign liquid assets are moved out of the country, and
also by potentially restricting the amount of its obligations that the central  bank would need
to "repay" in a given time period.
Thus,  to test the illiquidity  model we need to use  net short-term external  liabilities since  this
defines the range of fundamentals  over which a currency crisis is more likely to occur.
3. 2 Motivation  and Contribution to the Literature:
The  first  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  distinguish  across  similar  models  of  crises  by  their
transmission  mechanisms.  In particular,  the objective  is  to test across the "third generation"
of currency crisis models.  These are modified first generation models in which the focus is on
the  macroeconomic  implications  of  the  inconsistency  introduced  by  the  insolvency,  or
perceived  insolvency,  of the  central  bank,  the  domestic  banking  sector  or  the economy  as  a
whole.
In  this context  we  should  first  define  what  we mean by  observationally  equivalent.  As  an
example,  consider  the insurance  model  (Dooley,  1997).  Here  the crisis  takes place because
the government's  contingent liabilities,  arising from its function as lender of last resort to the
domestic financial sector, are  greater than its assets. Additionally, while contingent liabilities
nse  with  private  sector  borrowing,  the  central  banker  need  not  be  able  to  appropriate
domestic  assets. A "run" on the central bank becomes one of many possible equilibria. This is
empirically difficult to distinguish from the quasi-fiscal deficit generated by the government's
7monetization  of the  banking  sector's  losses.  The  monetization  occurs because  of implicit
guarantees  of the  domestic  financial  sector,  as  in  Kletzer  and  Chinn  (1999).  This  type  of
model formalizes  the logic behind the insurance model,  while endogenizing the imperfection
in the banking  system  that  generates  the  cnsis. Moral  hazard  is  attributable  to  the banks'
incentive  to  accept  greater  risk  since  there  is  a  lower  bound  on  the  assets  that  can  be
appropriated  from them. In this category of models, the interaction between the financial  and
the  currency  crisis  is  clearly  highlighted.  It  is  easier  to  distinguish  these  two  models
observationally  from  Chang  and  Velasco's  (1997)  liquidity  crisis, model,  which  takes  as
exogenous  the  imperfections  in  the  domestic  financial  sector,  and models  the  crisis  as  a
mismatch between liquid assets and liabilities.  Here the focus  is on net short-term liabilities,
while under the insurance model,  the predictor would be gross liabilities,  and some measure
of portfolio risk.
In Chinn, Dooley and Shreshtha (1998), Dooley's insurance model  is tested with data on total
domestic  credit to the banking sector. Since total domestic credit largely consists of domestic
credit to the banling sector, this test of the insurance model is in effect a test of the standard
first-generation  model'.  Moreover,  movements  in this variable  are strongly  correlated  with
movements  in  the  growth  of total  domestic  credit,  often  used  to,test  the  standard  first-
generation  model.  Growth  in  total  domestic  credit to  the private  sector  and  total  domestic
credit are correlated also with the evolution of total  liabilities of the private  sector, which are
the focus of the illiquidity model.
Chinn,  Dooley  and  Shreshtha  (1998)  use capital  flight  as  a proxy  for the  private  se$tor's
ability  to  appropnate  assets  from  the  government  as  a  means  of  preservation  from  a
"devaluation"  tax. An increase in capital flight before the currency crisis  is also an indicator
of  exchange  risk  expectations.  This  variable  can  therefore  be  used  as  a  proxy  for
expectational  shifts.  In  the model  developed  in Shankar  (2001), residents  can use  "capital
flight"  to  protect  their  welfare,  though  this  lowers  domestic  investment  and  growth  over
'Let  the model be Y=PX'+y,  where X is the matrix of explanatory variables and y is a serially
uncorrelated vector of disturbances. Now suppose  that the variables in Z are functions of the variables
m X such that Z=8X'+p.  Substituting in the model, we get Y=(I3/6)Z'  + 4, where t=y+(lI8)i.  Thus,
using Z and X is effectively the same model.
8certain  ranges  of fundamentals.  The  expected  devaluation  introduces  the motive  to place
assets  abroad  and  smooth  consumption  to  whatever  extent  possible  given  transactions
constraints.
As is necessary to distinguish across models, alternative specifications  must have at least one
unique identifying  exogenous variable in each  case. These focus variables include measures
of  capital  flight,  net  external  debt  and  gross  external  liabilities.  This  is  because,  as
demonstrated  in sections  2 and 3,  there is a need to  consider changes  in gross foreign  asset
and  liability positions,  gross foreign asset and liability flows and the term  structure of gross
liabilities.  Gross  debt  is  adjusted  for  forgiveness  and  arrears  on  interest  and  principal.
Considering only net changes  results in a loss of information  as highlighted in the review of
the "third-generation  models" that are the focus of this paper.
B. Contribution to the literature
(1)  The  construction  of the  data  set  allows  me  to  be  able  to  test  across  seemingly
observationally  equivalent  theories of currency  crises by distinguishing  patterns in the data
not  previously  available.  The  data  includes  gross  asset  and  liability  positions  for  all  the
countries  in  the sample  based on  which net foreign  asset positions  were  constructed  for  a
significantly  larger number  of countries  than was  available  earlier.  This  allows  a  direct
comparison of the validity of different indicators as sources of shifts in expectations.
(2) This new database  enables  us to distinguish between theories  of crises more effectively
than  in  previous  studies.  This  is especially  relevant  in  disentangling  the  various  first  and
modified first generation theories. This is done by identifying at least one unique exogenous
variable  associated with each crisis mechanism.
(4) Since  a crisis involves  a  fall in the  demand  for  domestic  assets,  we can  go beyond  the
simplification  that  domestic  money  is  the  only  relevant  "asset"  and  examine  the  role  of
volatilities  in gross asset inflows and outflows in causing a crisis given the NFA database.
94  Data and Methodology:
A. Data:
The details on the construction  of the database,  in particular the development  of gross stocks
of external  assets and liabilities  are  in the appendix  to this paper. The problem of negative
stocks is inevitable  since flows are accumulated  for countries where there is no stock data, on
the assumption that stocks were zero  in the first available  year.  Fortunately, this problem is
rare, and the adjustment  required to ensure non-negative  stocks was less than 0.3% of GDP in
all  cases.  Starting with  a database  of over 200 countries,  only those  are retained  that have
population  greater  than  one  million  and per  capita  GDP  greater  than  $1000  in  1990. All
variables  are in 1990 US dollars.
The  database  has a mix of 167  developed  and  developing countries  over a wide  variety of
geographical  regions  with  a  great  deal  of heterogeneity  in their  political  and  institutional
environments2. A number of countries out of these are "new" and therefore with limited time-
series  data  was available.  Eliminating  countries  with less  than 20  years of data  for all  the
relevant variables leaves the results unchanged.  The rationale for eliminating countries  with
a population of I million or less in  1990 since very small  economies raise specific empirical
issues.3 In addition,  we use Bossone,  Honohan and Long (2001) to distinguish countries with
total  M2  (money + quasi-money)  less than  2 billion in  1998. In other words,  if the  financial
system was  approximately the size of the local credit union in that year, is the country more
vulnerable  to  crises  or  not?  Morley  (1997)  is  used  for  the  construction  of the  capital
restnctions index and the political violence index. The construction of the crisis index follows
the  methodology  of  Glick  and  Hutchison  (1999).  In  addition,  various  country-specific
dummies are  included, for example, political violence,  rule of law,  existence of black market
premium on official exchange  rate, current and capital account restrictions. There are several
examples in  the received literature  on the use  of such  dummies.  The  inclusion  of political
variables  in particular  has several precedents  in the literature.  Other authors have controlled
for this by including dummies  for incumbent electoral  victory or loss, change of government
or of finance  minister,  legal or illegal executive transfer (Eichengreen  et al, 1995; Klein and
Marion,  1994) and political uncertainty.  Morley's indices (Morley,  1997) are used here since
2 Listed in the Appendix
10they  match  closely  the  sample  period while  providing  a  measure  that  is  adequate  to  the
purpose  at hand  without being  a  0-1  dummy.  In  a  framework  in  which  there  is a limited
dependent variable,  this reduces the risk of co-linearity.  An index of political instability was
also used by Edwards and Santaella (1993), and by Milesi-Ferretti  and Razin (1995).
B: Methodology:
The model is briefly outlined in this section, and a detailed explanation of the intuition behind
the probit framework chosen for this analysis  is reserved for the appendix. As opposed to the
signals  based  "early  waming  system"  type  literature,  the  need  here  is  for  an  estimation
method that would be flexible  to testing  for the timing of the crisis as well  as for threshold
levels  of fundamentals  in  as  transparent  a  manner  as possible.  Several  authors  have  used
similar estimation  techniques  (for example,  Elchengreen  et al,  1995; Glick and Hutchison,
2001; Tomell,  1999).  The event is the occurrence  of a crisis. The estimated coefficients  are
used  to  infer  the impact  of the  independent vanables  on the  likelihood of the  event taking
place.
The key explanatory variables on the RHS of equation A5 (Appendix A) are total net extemal
liabilities  of the economy  and an  index variable  for capital  controls  when testing  the Chang
and Velasco "illiquidity"  argument. To test the insurance  model, the appropriate explanatory
varnables  are gross  external  liabilities and capital  flight.  The rationale  behind  the choice of
variables  was explained in Section 2: A2 and A3 above. A comparison of goodness of fit and
marginal effects would allow identification of which model has superior predictive .power.
Formally,  as defined in Section 2: A.2 and A.3, we can write out the models we are testing as
in equations  1,2 and 3.
The Nested Model:
This is a control regression  in which a variety of cross-model predictors are included.
bank credit  M2
Crisis,,  = F(,  fiscal deficit,  M2,  capital  in - flight, political
GDP  reserves  (1)
violence, capital and current  account  restrictions,  gross external  liabilities)  +  c,,
' See Kraay (1998)  for a discussion of these issues.  IThe Insurance Model:
The  variables  are  identified  in  Section  2.A2,  where  the  model  is  described.  The  control
regressors  are in Table 2 at the end of this section.
Crisis,, = F(gross  external liabilities,  capital  flight, control regressors)  +  E,,  (2)
The Eliquiditv Model:
The  variables  are  identified  in  Section  2.A3,  where  the  model  is  described.  The  control
regressors are in Table 2 at the end of this section.
Crisis,  = F(net  external liabilities,  capital  flight, control regressors)  +  e,,  (3)
The included regressors  are summarized in Table  1:
Table 1: The Explanatory Variables
FOCUS  CONTROL
log of external liabilities gross  log of fiscal deficit
log of net external debt  log of money/nongoldreserves
fall  in net stock of capital flight  log of GDP
volatility in M2/non-gold reserves  change in current account deficit
Crisis (0,1)  index of political violence
GDPDUM:  the variable defined as  domestic credit to the banking sector
ytt
real domestic interest rate-real world interest rate (bank
rate/discount rate adjusted for inflation in the GDP deflator)
Index of capital account restrictions
Index of current account restrictions
125  Results:
This section  focuses on the first objective of this paper, namely,  can  we find pattems in the
data that help distinguish theories that are seemingly observationally  equivalent.
A. The Nested Model:
"Nested" refers to the full range of first, second and "third" generation predictors  for the full
sample of 167 countries  are included as described  in equation  1.
The results  are  reported  in Table  3.  They  indicate  support  for  "third  generation"  models.
There is also support  for the role of capital and  current account restrictions,  gross external
liabilities and for volatility in M2/non-gold reserves.
Three  specifications  are presented.  The  first  includes  all  variables,  the  second,  all  except
current  account  restrictions  and  the  third,  all  except  capital  account  restrictions.  Overall
goodness  of fit  is  measured by  the  likelihood  ratio  test  (chi-square  test),  which  suggests
statistical significance  at  1%. There are 189 crisis episodes and 1489 observations. The actual
probability of a crisis is 12.5% while predicted probability is  10.8%. More precisely, a crisis
is called correctly  if a  crisis is predicted when it actually  occurs.  It is called incorrectly  if a
crisis is predicted where none occurs in which case we have a type  2 error. If a crisis occurs
but the prediction  is of no crisis we have a type one error.  The probability  of calling a crisis
correctly  is 55.3%. The probability  of a type I error is 44.7%  suggesting a tendency towards
underestimation of the outcome, while the probability of a type 2 error is 4.7%.
(1)  Fundamentals:  Of these, log GDP  lagged one period,  gross external  liabilities,  log fiscal
surplus  (normalized  so  there  are  no  negative  values),  log  M2/non-gold  reserves,  gross
external  liabilities and domestic credit to the banking sector as a ratio to GDP are statistically
significant  crisis  predictors  with  the  expected  sign.  All  are  robust  to  changes  in  model
specification.
13(2)  Political  uncertainty:  The  variable  "polvio"  is  a  country  specific  score  of  political
violence.  The lower the score the worse the country is doing in terms of political  stability. It
enters with the correct sign, is statistically  significant and robust.
(3)  Capital  flight:  The  results  are  mixed,  dependmg  on  the measure  of capital  flight used.
Ultimately the best results come by using change  in capital flight measure  "a", computed by
the residual  method  (Claessens,  1998;  Dooley,  1998).  However,  though  the  sign  is correct
(note that this variable  is minus capital flight so we expect  it to have  a negative  sign), and its
inclusion  improves  the  overall  predictive  power of the probit  model,  it  is not  statistically
significant. This probably has something  to do with measurement  errors in the case of several
developing countnes.
(4) Current Account:  Current account restrictions  appear to be  significant,  and enter with a
positive sign, i.e. the greater the restrictions on the current account, the higher the probability
of a  crisis.  This is  as expected  given that  current  account restrictions  hinder  the ability  of
agents  to  smooth  consumption,  thus  increasing  perceived  vulnerability  to  a  crisis.  The
predictor is not robust however, and is dominated by capital account restrictions.
(5)  Capital Account: Capital account restrictions are significant and enter with a positive sign.
This predictor appears to be robust, and outperforms  current account related  variables. Thus,
liberalizing the capital account does not increase  the likelihood of a crisis.
B: Distinguishing between liquidity and insurance models:
The most encouraging results are under this heading. The results are reported  in Table 4. The
distinction  from  the  previous  sub-section  is  that  we  are  now  specifically  contrasting  the
insurance  and  illiquidity  models  of currency  crisis.  We have  189  and  171  currency  crisis
episodes  out  of  1486  and  1282  observations  for  the  insurance  and  illiquidity  models
respectively.  Actual vs. predicted probability of a crisis is 12.5%  vs.  10.8%  for the insurance
model, and  13.3% vs. 11.7%  for the liquidity model. Once again,  conditional probabilities of
calling a crisis correctly  are  computed,  i.e., of making a type  I or a  type  2 error.  These  are
1456%,  44%  and  4.7%  respectively  for  the  insurance  model  and  53%,  47%  and  4.5%
respectively for the liquidity model.
The overall goodness of fit is again captured by the likelihood ratio test (chi-square test), and
suggests  both  specifications  are  statistically  significant  at  1%.  The points  of comparison
emerge clearly as we examine the results on individual variables.
(1)  Gross  liabilities:  Gross  liabilities  are highly robust,  statistically  significant predictors of
crises, whether log-levels or change in log-levels  are used.
(2)  Capital  flight: Capital  flight also should be a predictor of crises according  to this model,
and is in line with our use of gross liabilities. The results are mixed. While the variable enters
with the correct sign, it is not statistically significant.
(3)  Net foreign  assets: Netting out assets reduces  the equations predictive power, and the net
variable is not significant.  Net liabilities  are defined as gross liabilities minus gross assets, in
order to be consistent  across countries.  An alternative would be to use external  debt figures
(the most comprehensive  data sources  being the OECD, lenders figures and the World Bank,
debtors  figures) but these are constructed using quite a different  methodology and include all
kinds of concessional  and strategic  lending and borrowing.
(4)  Fundamentals:  Once  again,  the  control  variables  that  are  meant  to  represent  the
fundamentals are robust and significant:  log of GDP, gross external liabilities, capital account
restrictions and index of political violence.
6  Conclusions:
In  this  paper,  the  objective  was  to  demonstrate  how  different  crises  that  are  apparently
"observationally  equivalent",  can  be  distinguished  with  the  help  of data  on gross  foreign
liabilities. This means that different  transmission mechanisms that are difficult to disentangle
based  on  movements  in  the  typical  predictors,  can  be  clearly  identified  with  the  help  of
15patterns in the new variables  defined in the database. The distinction between gross and net
external  liabilities  is used to demonstrate  that models  utilizing an  "insurance"  based  logic,
such as Dooley (1998)  and Chin  and Kletzer (1999)  appear to perform better than those  that
rely on arguments around term structure  of external debt and net external illiquidity.
However,  further distinguishing  between different models within this sub-category  of "third-
generation"  models is difficult in the absence of time-series data on non-performing  loans. In
this context, the relatively  lower output loss faced by Brazil (compared  to Russia, Turkey or
Argentina) in weathering the crisis has been linked to the relatively lower dollarized liabilities
of the banking sector.  This points  to the  role of moral  hazard not only in crisis timing, but
also  in the  crisis after-effects.  A devaluation is much  more costly for the economy if banks
have  large  net  foreign  liabilities.  Since  insurance  is  a  pre-requisite  for the  moral  hazard
argument  to  hold,  these  two  frameworks  are  effectively  tested  together,  though  the
availability  of consistent and  comprehensive data on non-performing  loans would enable us
to distinguish the transmission mechanism of the crisis and its consequences more clearly.
The  ability of the  policy  maker  in  limiting  its  contingent  liabilities  is  also  crucial.  This
suggests  that a credit line with performance  conditionalities  from the international  financial
system might be more effective  than the allowing the central bank  to become  the lender  of
last resort in order to attract more foreign capital.
It  is  interesting  that  capital  account  restrictions  are  positively  and  robustly  related  to  the
occurrence  of crises  in  our estimates.  This  is exactly  consistent  with Glick and  Hutchison
(2000), who also find that capital account restrictions  increase the likelihood of a crisis. This
might be because countries that have attempted capital controls in the past have been largely
ineffective  at  implementing  them,  i.e.,  capital  flight  continues  more  or  less  unchecked.
Capital controls may also send a signal to agents who believe that information is asymmetric,
that  policy  makers  think  that  fundamentals  are  not  in  line  with  the  exchange  rate.
Alternatively,  as in the model of Shankar (2001),  agents believe that policy makers  are trying
to  avoid  an  erosion  of  the  inflation  tax  base,  thereby  triggering  the  belief  that  future
government spending will rise to a growth rate no longer consistent with the peg.
16Capital flight is positively correlated with crises as expected, and though the marginal effect
is tiny, Tables 3 and 4 would suggest this is a significant predictor.  Certainly, it appears to be
a robust finding that imposing capital restrictions is unhelpful in lowering the likelihood of a
currency  crisis.  The  role  of current  account  restrictions  is  less  clear on  the  likelihood  of
crises, though they enter with a negative and significant coefficient in the output equation, as
expected  given  previous  related  work. In  Hutchison  (2001),  for example,  the  disruption of
balance of payments is a source of output and employment losses.
The political variable  used in the regressions  is highly robust and statistically significant.  It is
meant  to  capture  uncertainty  regarding  the  policy  maker's  future  objectives,  though
potentially this is just one possible interpretation.
Appendix A
The probit framework referred to in Section 4B:
Single Equation Approach:
The intuition behind the probit model is as follows. The ability of the policymaker to ward off
the crisis (Crisis  *) is not something that can be observed directly. The actual event of a crisis
occurring  can  however  be  directly  observed.  This  can  be  expressed  in  equation  (Al)  as
follows.
Crisis%,  = F(6v,,) +  e0  (Al)
where,
gi,=N(O, o2)
such  that  the  disturbances  are  independent  across  groups,  though  they may be  correlated
across time.
Further,
Crisisi,  =  {  I if Crisis  * t < 0, 0 otherwise.
and,
17Crisis,, ' = E[Crisis*,,  /IJ
= F(  a  v,,)  (A2)
This is equivalent  to the statement that,
Probability  (Crisis,,=1) = F( /'v,,)  (A3)
and,
Probability  (Crisis,,=O) =1 - F(  fyv,,)  (A4)
Crisis  * =  unobservable ability of policy maker to ward off a crisis.
"Crisis"  refers to the crisis.  index.
Crisis = 0 if no crisis occurred;  = 1 if a crisis did take place.
"i " indexes the n countries, while t refers to the time subscript.
"v" is the matrix of variables
,f is the vector of parameters  that reflect the impact of  "v" on the probability  that the crisis
occurs.
Using equation  A2,  the expectation  that  a crisis  will  occur  is thus  the estimated  dependent
variable from equation A5.
Crisis,, =  F(a6'v,,  ) +  8,,  (Al)
Thus, equation (4)  says that the expected  likelihood of a crisis is a non-linear function "F'  of
the variables included in "v". This is also referred to as a univariate probit model.
The  solution  method  is based  on maximum  likelihood  estimation.  The joint probability  or
likelihood  function  follows  a  normal  distribution  in  case  of  the  probit  model.  Each
observation  is  a  single  draw  from  a Bemoulli  distribution,  and  the  success  probability  is
F(/8'v).
Inference  in  the probit  framework  is based  on predicted  probabilities  from which  we  can
estimate  marginal  effects.  The  marginal  effects  capture, the- individual  variables'  impact on
the likelihood of the occurrence of the dependent variable, in this case. a currency crisis.
18The marginal  effects are interpreted as follows:
WE[Crisis,, II  (A6)
0(t)  is the  standard  normal  density and  is computed  following  Greene,  1996.  Thus,  a  1%
change in the explanatory  variable  generates  a change  in the probability of a crisis occurring
given by the RHS of equation A5.
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Table 2: Summary of Previously Used Crisis Predictors and the Underlying  Rationale
Type of  Model  Transmission  Empirical Implications Predictors used in previous studies  y Variables
Mechanism
A.  Links  output  and  Firms,  Reserves  and demand  Numerical  calibration  using  Volatility  m
currency  crises:  example:  individuals  for  money  are  crisis  Mexican data  government
Mendoza  and  Uribe  and  the  predictors;  spending,
(1999), Shankar (2001)  govermment  M2/  reserves,
interact  in  a  Currency  crises  are  control
framework  in  followed by  "fundamental
which  the  recessions  s",.  measures
probability of  of  capital
a crisis enters  flight,  gross
an  external
equilibrium  liabilities,
business  and  GDP
cycle model  growth.
Links  output  and  Failure  of  Banking  crises  are  Deposit  Insurance,  Financial  n.a
financial  crises:  example  domestic  accompanied,  by  Liberalization,  Moral  - -Hazard
Hutchison  and  McDill  financial  prolonged recessions  dummies,  growth  in  GDP  &  real
(1999),  Hutchison (2001)  interrnediatio  credit,  nominal  and  real  interest
n  rates,  inflation,  movements in stock
prices,  fiscal  deficit,  M2/Reserves,
rate of nominal depreciation.
20Table 2 continued
Type of Model  Transmission  Empirical  Predictors  used  in  My Variables
Mechanism  Implications  previous studies
B.  Worsening  Fall  in  international  Fiscal  Deficit,  real  GDP,  Same
Standard  First-  fundamentals  causes  reserves,  worsening  government consumption,
generation Model  fall  in  government  fiscal  deficit  pre-  measures  of  domestic
example:  Krugman  reserves  crisis,  no  policy  credit:  examples:  Collins,
(1979)  change post-crisis  1995;  Kaminsky  and
Reinhart,  1996.
First-Generation  There  is  a  stochastic  The  nominal  Volatility in M2/reserves:  Volatility  in
Stochastic  Models  element  either  to  the  exchange  rate  has  a  example:  Maloney  and  M2/reserves,
and  target  zone  demand  for  domestic  random  walk  Galindo, 1998.  fiscal  deficit,
models:  Krugman  money  or  to  the  component  demand  for
and  Rotemberg  nominal  exchange  domestic  assets,
(1991),  Calvo (1996),  rate  government
Flood  and  Marion  consumption,
(1996),  model  measures  of
outlined  in  Shankar  capital flight.
(2001)
Second  Generation  Worsening  exchange  Expectations  become  Expectations proxies such  Expectations;  net
Models.  rate  expectations  self-fulfilling  as  as  interest  differentials  external  debt;
examples:  Flood  and  manifest  in  either  devaluation  is  one of  growth in real wages, net  public debt
Garber  (1984),  higher wage  demands  many  possible  government  debt,  both
Obstfeld (1994,1996)  or  increased  burden  equilibria:  higher  domestic and foreign, net
of  servicing  interest  rates  and  errors  and  omissions  as
government  debt  expansionary  proxy  for  capital  flight:
through seignorage.  monetary policy post-  examples:  Kaminsky  et
crisis  al, 1997.
21(Table 2 continued)
Type of Model  Transmission  Mechanism  Empirical  Predictors  used  in  My  Variables
pImlications  previous  studies
Third  - Generation,  (a)Domestic  economy  is  Increase  in  Expectations  proxies  Gross  extemal
Models:  perceived  as  being  over-  inflows  pre-  such  as  interest  liabilities
(a)Liquidity  crises  or  extended  causing  a run  on  crisis;  drawing  differentials  growth  (loans,equity  and
bank runs  the banks as investors want  down  of  in  real  wages,  net  FDI)  as  well  as  net
(b)Insurance Models  out  before  the  expected  reserves  once  govemment  debt,  extemal  short-term
(c)Moral Hazard  devaluation;  adverse  this  is  reversed;  both  domestic  and  debt.
examples:  Dooley  shocks  are  amplified  by  higher  domestic  foreign,  net  errors
(1998),  Chinn  and  the  weakness  of  the  banking  activity  and  omissions  as
Kletzer  (1999),  domestic financial sector.  pre-crisis;  proxy  for  capital
Chang  and  Velasco  (b)In  insurance  models,  increase  in  flight; domestic credit
(1997).  expectations  do  not jump,  domestic  credit  to the banking  sector;
but  central  bank  is  to  the  banking  increase  in  bank
monetizing  the  banking  sector;  activity;  vanous
sector's  deficit:  the  worsening  macro  fundamentals:
government  is  lender  of  exchange  rate  examples:  Corsetti  et
last  resort  to  domestic  expectations  as  al  1998;  Chinn  and
financial sector.  in  second-  Dooley,  1998;
(c)Imperfect  information/  generation
informational  asymmetries  models;
lead- to -a  financial  crisis  possibly
that  spill  over  into  a  worsening





Dependent variable: Currency crisis (0 = no crisis, 1=crisis)
Methodology:  Univariate Probit Model
Model: Nested  Model
Robust Standard Errors: Huber/White/Sandwich  Estimates
Explanatory Variable  Marginal Effect
Computed at Mean, %
Statistic)
(1)  (2)  (3)
Fall  in  capital  flight  -.001  -.001  -.001
Fall in capital flight  (-3.99)  (-3.92)  (-3.94)
Gross external liabilities  (t-1)  4.97  (4  5)49
-. 410  -. 370  -.385
Log of fiscal surplus  (-3.0)  (-2.74)  (-2.83)
Log of M2/non-gold reserves  2.55  2.39  .62.63)7
43.77  136)  (.63)
Current Account Restrictions  4.77  10)3
Log of GDP (t-1)  -2.97  -3.00  -3.03
(-2.64)  (-2.62)  (-2.65)
Domestic  credit  to  the  banking  -.071  -.069  -.070
sector  (-2.0)  (-1.96)  (-1.96)
Index of political violence  -3.21  -3.12  -2.90
Index of pol  _________________  (-2.59)  (3.97)  (-2.38)
Capital Account Restrictions  8.38  7.75
______  _____  ______  _____  __  A~1  A  .9  )  3  . 1)
Sunuma  Statistics
Likelihood Ratio (x2)  79.6  78.6  78.2
(critical value)  (21.96)  (21.96)  (21.96)
Log likelihood  -525.2  -519.3  -518.8
No. of crises  186  186  186
No. of observations  1489  1486  1484
Actual Probability  12.49%  12.52%  12.53%
Predicted Probability  11.07%  10.76%  10.77%
4Bold indicates significance at 5% or less. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses
23Table 4 5
Dependent variable: Currency crisis (0 = no crisis,  1=crisis)
Methodology:  Univariate Probit
Model: Insurance vs. Liquidity
Robust Standard Errors: Huber/White/Sandwich Estimates
Marginal Effect
Explanatory Variable  Computed at Mean, %
(Z-St  tistic)
Model A: Insurance  Model B: Liquidity
Fall  in  capital flight (t-1)  -.001  -.00001
Fall in capital flight (t-l)  (-3.92)  (-1.13)
Gross extemal liabilities (t-1): Model A  .096
Or change  in net external  liabilities:  5.45  (1.27)
Model B  (4.16)
Log of fiscal surplus  -.371  -.353
(-2.74)  (-2.29)
Log of M2/non-gold reserves  366)  3.13
(3.6)  (4.3)
Log of GDP (t-1)  (-2.62)  (1.98)
Domestic credit to the banking sector  -.069  -.041
Index of political violence  -3.12  -3.01
(-2.63)  (-2.28)
Capital Account Restrictions  8(38  9.50
(3.9)  (3.5)
Summary Statistics
Likelihood Ratio (x2)  78.69  60.92
(critical value)  (21.96)  (21.96)
Log likelihood  -519.36  -469.5
No. of crses  186  171
No. of observations  1486  1282
Actual Probability  12.52%  13.34%
. Predicted Probability  10.76%  11.71%
5  Bold indicates  level of significance 5% or lower. Z-Statistics are in parentlieses.
24Appendix: Constructing the Data Set
The  goal  of the  database  was  to  obtain  international  investment  positions  of countries  by
constructing  estimates  of  foreign  assets  and  liabilities  and  their  subcomponents  for  173
countries for the period  1960-97, using data from the balance of payments, Recent Economic
Development  Reports  of  the  IMF  and  various  country  specific  sources  detailed  in  the
appendix where required (See Kraay, Loayza and Serven,  1999).  The estimates are based on
existing  stock data,  supplemented by cumulation  of flow data with the appropriate valuation
adjustment.  For  foreign  direct  investment,  since  the  estimates  are  highly  sensitive  to  the
valuation  adjustment made, we include more than one version of the data. For FDI and equity
data,  in  addition to  the  estimation  at "historical"  cost,  we  constructed  stock measures  that
reflect  changes  in  market  prices  and  exchange  rates.  We  also  construct  two  measures  of
capital flight with the details given below.
We start by presenting the accounting framework that highlights the link between balance of
payments  flows  and the  stocks of assets  and liabilities.  Next,  we will  look at the formulas
used  in  the  flow  cumulation  exercise  and  at  the  valuation  adjustments  (including
depreciation).
A3.1.1:  Balance of Payments Accounting:
The  net  external  position  of the  economy,  its  NFA,  is  given  by the  sum  of the net  debt
position,  the net equity stock position and the net FDI stock position. Net position refers  to
gross assets minus gross liabilities.
NFA, = FDIA, + EQA,  + LA,  + RSM,  - FDIL, - EQL, - LL,  (1)
Where,
FDIA = Foreign Direct Investment  Stock of Assets
FDIL = Foreign Direct Investment Stock of Liabilities
EQUA = Equity Asset Stocks
25EQUL = Equity Liability Stocks
LA  = Other Loans Asset Stocks
LL = Other Loans Liabilities Stocks (henceforth external  debt)
RSM = Foreign Exchange Reserves
We next discuss how we obtain the NFA for a country when direct stock measures of all the
right hand side variables are not available.
A3.1.2: Some identities: -
When  direct  stock  measures  for  disaggregated  assets  and  liabilities  are not  available,  we
estimate  stocks  by  cumulating  flow  data.  The  convention  in  balance-of-payments  is  for
capital  inflows  to have a  positive sign and  for capital outflows to have a negative  sign. We
correct  for this by multiplying the flow data on assets (outflows) with negative  one, so except
for the case  where repayments  exceed  receipts,  we  should have  no negative  asset flows.  In
Table  I,  we  list the  components of the balance of payments  as presented  in the  Balance of
Payments Manual, version  5.0. We treat the "below the line" items (what the IMF refers to as
financing items) as sources of changes in the stock of external  indebtedness.
Analogous  to  the  definition  of NFA  above,  since  flows  are  defined  as  the  change  in  the
corresponding stock, the current account, ca can be defined as follows:
ca= equa-equl+fdia-fdil+la-ll-ka+fx  (2)
wherefx refers to change in reserves
ka refers to net outflows on the capital account.
Lower case letters refer to flows.
Next, we define the cumuilative  current account,  CUMCA(t)
CUMCA  5  (t)  =  CA,  (3)
26Next, we relate the cumulative  flows of equation (3) to the NFA defined in equation (1).
A3.1.3: Estimating the Net Foreign Asset Position:
We start with  the  assumption  that we can  assume that the balance of payments  of the IMF
provides  accurate flow data (gross and net) for the capital account.  Then to arrive at CUMCA
we  need only an  assumption  on the country's initial wealth.  We use all  the available  stock
data filling the gaps with cumulated flows according  to the following formula:
A3.1.3.1: Other Loans (non-equity assets and liabilities) Including  Reserve Assets:
We  discuss the construction  of this section of the database  in detail,  since estimating  gross
positions  on  non-equity  assets  and  liabilities  was  highly  challenging.  For  loan  (more
generally,  non-equity) assets and liabilities, we have the following data sources on stocks:
Industrial countries - we  have  some  UIP  data,  generally  incomplete,  on both  assets  and
liabilities.  Rider (1994)  provides  some  additional  stock data  based on national  documents.
Combining both sources,  we very likely have at least  one observation  on the stocks  of loan
assets and liabilities for each industrial country (this to be checked)
Developing  countries - we have  data from the World Bank'  GDF on non-equity liabilities
covering  1970-present,  for all  developing  countries.  Coverage  is excellent for medium and
long-term liabilities, and more limited for short-term liabilities. For a few countries excluded
from the WB  dataset (Portugal,  Singapore)  comparable data can be obtained for the OECD's
External Debt Statistics. There is no comparable source of data on non-equity assets.
Finally,  for  both  industrial  and  developing  countries  reporting  to  the  BIS,  there  is  data
regarding commercial  bank foreign asset / liability positions.
27Non-equity  liabilities  (LL):  Because  we  lack  minimal  data  on  the  secondary-market
valuation  of non-equity assets and liabilities, treatment of valuation effects will be limited to
cross-currency  exchange rate changes.  In terms of the general  accumulation  equation,  define
fLL (c,t)  =  e(c,t)/PLL(c,t) to be the unit price in US dollars of foreign liabilities (e.g., the dollar
exchange  rate of the DM,  in the case of DM-denominated  instruments); note thatfuL =  I for
dollar-denominated  instruments.  Hence, we have:
LL(c,t + 1) = LL(c,t)  fLL (c,t + 1)  P(t)  + ll(c,t + 1) - forgiv(c,t + 1)
P refers to the US CPI (base  1990=100),  while e refers to the l.c.u/US$ exchange rate.
In fact, the GDF provides direct information on the valuation term
LL(c, t)- ff  (c, t + 1)
However,  the data are incomplete before  1989.  In addition, GDF presents tables showing the
currency composition  of external  debt starting in  1970,  from which it would be possible  to
calculate  the  above  valuation  effect  - although  the  tables  show  substantial  amounts
denominated in "other currencies" and "multiple currencies"  for which the calculations would
not be possible.
The  term forgive(c,  t+l) captures  debt  reduction  operations  (forgiveness,  buybacks  and
conversions) occurred during period t+l. This reduces the liabilities of the debtor country and
the assets of the creditor country. Data arranged by debtor (as would be needed for the above
equation)  is  also  available  from  GDF; data by  creditor is  however  unavailable  except  for
official debt forgiven by OECD countries after 1990.
The empirical  procedure  should make use, to the extent possible, of the available stock data.
Hence,  for  developing  countries  we  will  ignore  the  above  accumulation  equation  and use
directly the stock data compiled in GDF.
28For  industrial  countries,  we  lack comprehensive  information  on stocks  and their  currency
composition;  forgiveness  of liabilities  can  be safely  set at zero.  Hence  we complement  the
available stock data with a simplified accumulation equation with fLL  = 1 andforgive = 0.
Non-equity  assets  (LA): Conceptually, here we have three kinds of assets:
- Foreign exchange reserves (FX)
- Recorded non-equity assets excluding reserves (RLA)
- Unrecorded  non-equity  assets  (i.e.,  "flight  capital"),  likely  to  be  important  for  most
developing countries  (ULA).
Hence LA(c,t)  = FX(c,t) + RLA(c,t)  + ULA(c,t).
In  comparison  with  the non-equity  liabilities,  here  we  face three  additional  data  problems.
First,  we  lack  stock  data  - with  the  important  exception  of  foreign  exchange  reserves
(available  from  IFS)  and  commercial  bank  asset/liability  data  (available  from  BIS  for
reporting  countries).  Second,  we  do  not have  information  on the  destination  and currency
composition of flows. Third, by definition we have no information on unrecorded assets.
Thus, we adopt a three-pronged strategy.
For reserves, we will use stock data from IFS (gross reserves excluding gold).
For recorded  non-equity assets, we will use an accumulation  equation similar to that used for
liabilities,  but ignoring  valuation  effects  (i.e.,  effectively  assuming  that all flows entail  the
acquisition of dollar-denominated  assets):
RLA(c,t  +l1)  = RLA(c,t).  p(t)  +rla(c,t+1)-forgiv(c,t+1)
P(t +  1)
where data  on forgiveness  will be taken  from  the OECD  (and hence  limited to official  debt
forgiveness by donor countries,  and zero otherwise).
A3.1.3.2:  Domestic  Capital Stock,  Foreign Direct Investment:
29As before, we add to the initial  level of foreign direct investment,  the flow of the next year.
However,  unlike non-equity assets, now both depreciation and valuation  issues anse.
The formula  is essentially the same as above:
K(t+  1)=(I  -d)K(t) V(t+I) +I(t+  1)
where  K(t+l) is  the  stock  at the  end  of period  t+1  in  constant  1990  US  dollars,  d is  the
depreciation  rate,  I(t+]) is  the corresponding  flow  during penod t+l  in constant  1990  US
dollars,  and  V(t+l) is  the  valuation  factor.  For  example,  in  the  case  of domestic  capital
stocks,  V(t+1)=(e(t)/e(t+J))(Pk(t+l)/Pk(t))(P(t)/P(t+l)), where  e(t)  is  the  l.c.u/US$
exchange rate, Pk(t) is the local currency investment deflator,  and P(t) is the US CPI.
In  the  case  of FDIA,  Pk(t)  is  computed  as  the  geometrically  weighted  local  currency
investment deflator  of the destination  countries with weights computed6 as the share of each
country  in the source country's  outward  FDI stocks in  19957. It seemed  safe to assume  here
that FDIA is negligible  for developing countries.
For FDI in the country, FDIL, the relevant  deflator is the local currency investment  deflator
in  the  destination  country.  For  foreign  direct  investment,  assets  and  liabilities,  the
depreciation rate assumed was 4%.
A3.1.3.3:  Equity Investment:
6 Source: OECD
7 This is  potentially a problem since it distorts the picture for earlier years given significant
comnpositional changes. This is especially true of countries that have recently  invested more in
economies that experienced hyperinflation  in earlier years.
30The  same  formula  is  used  as  above.  For  EQUA,  Pk(t)  is  the  Morgan  Stanley  World
Composite  Index8, while  for  EQUL, Pk(t) is the  stock  market  index  from IFS.  As for non-
equity  assets and  liabilities,  we  assume  depreciation  is  zero (or all flow  data  is already  at
market value).
A3.1.3.4:  Capital FUght:
Finally, for unrecorded  non-equity assets we implement two alternative measures:
(a)  Cumulative sum of errors and omissions  starting from the first date available:
ULAa(c,t +1) = ULAa(c,t)  *  +e&o(c,t +1)
P(t +  1)
(b) For developing countries,  we compute a second measure of unrecorded non-equity assets
as the cumulated sum of errors and omissions, plus the cumulated  sum of net non-equity
liability flows, minus the foreign debt stock as reported by the World Bank:
ULAC (c, t) = ULAa (c, t) + LL(c, t) - D WB(c, t)
where DWB is the debt stock reported by the World Bank, and ULAa and LL  are constructed
from the accumulation equations introduced earlier.
Based  on the identities in sections A3.2.1  and A3.2.2,  and in Table I in the appendix to this
paper, we can obtain the net foreign asset position of the country as
NFA = CUMCA + KA  (4)
While  we  completed  the  calculations  for.173  countries,  we  retain  for  the  purposes  of
econometric  investigation  only countries that have at least 20 years  of data for all variables.
We are finally left with 90 countries,  listed in the appendix.
A3.2.  Data Sources:
8  Source:  Global Financial Database, Morgan Stanley
31Various issues of the Balance of  Payments Yearbook
Balance ofPayments, Version 5
International  Financial  Statistics
World Development Indicators
Global  Development Finance
Country Specific Sources: Various Issues of
IMF: Recent Economic Developments
World Bank. Country Economic Memorandums
central  bank Bulletins
Rider, Mark (1994),  "External  Debt and Liabilities of  Industrial Countries  "  Reserve
Bank ofAustralia Discussion Paper  9405.
32Balance of Payments (IFS line no. in parentheses):
Current Account (78ald):  ca
Capital Account balance  (78bcd): ka
Direct Investment Abroad (78bdd):fdia
Direct Investmnent  in country (78bed):fdil
Portfolio Investment Assets (78bfd):  = Portfolio Investmnent Debt Assets +
Portfolio  Investmnent Equity Assets = equa
Portfolio Investment Liabilities (78bgd):  = Portfolio Investmnent Debt Liabilities +
Portfolio  Investmnent Equity Liabilities = equl
Other Investment Assets (78bhd): la
Other Investmnent Liabilities (78bid):  11
Financial account (78bjd): fa=fdia-fdil+equa-equl+la-lI
Net errors and omissions (78cad): eo=ca+ka+fa+fin
Reserves and related items (financing items) (79dad):  f  =fx+ef+imf
Reserve assets (79ded):fx
Exceptional  financing (79ded): ef
Fund Credit and Loans  (79dcd):  imf
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